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 Abstract 
History suggests that once alliances have successfully accomplished their objectives, they quickly 
come to an end. The peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, did not lead in parallel fashion 
to the rapid demise of the anti-Soviet transatlantic alliance. The subject of this paper is whether the 
political institutions that once undergirded the anti-Soviet alliance—in particular, the institutions of 
the Atlantic community—can long endure after the demise of the common rival. Focusing on the 
effects of structural change on the grand strategy of the United States and especially on US relations 
with France and Germany, this paper reviews the implicit bargain upon which the post-World War 
Two Atlantic alliance rested and the transformation that both the Atlantic bargain and alliance have 
undergone since the end of the Cold War. Building upon this analysis, the article examines the effects 
of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 as well as the Iraq war on the 
transatlantic alliance. The paper concludes by assessing the prospects for a new transatlantic bargain 
upon which the alliance can endure. 
Keywords  
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Introduction 
History suggests that once alliances have successfully accomplished their objectives, they quickly 
come to an end. A prominent example is the great anti-Nazi coalition of the mid-twentieth century, 
which did not long survive the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. Within months of the end of World War 
Two, the alliance between the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom was under enormous 
strain; a few years later it collapsed altogether. The Cold War ensued, a great contest between rival 
blocs centred around Washington and Moscow that went on for some forty years. By the 1990s, 
however, the Soviet empire had dissolved and the former Soviet Union had disappeared. Whether the 
political institutions that once undergirded the anti-Soviet alliance—in particular, the institutions of the 
Atlantic community—can long endure after the demise of the common rival is the subject of this paper. 
Of course the parallel with the Grand Alliance of the Second World War is fraught with 
difficulties. The collapse of the anti-Nazi pact was hardly surprising: only an unlikely series of 
remarkable events had brought Moscow and Washington into open alliance with each other and with 
London.
1 It required the combination of Hitler’s betrayal of Stalin in June 1941, Japan’s surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, and Nazi Germany’s declaration of war on the United 
States four days later to draw the two greatest powers outside of Germany into the war against Berlin. 
The resulting wartime pact was an alliance of convenience among partners with a mutual foe but 
without either mutual interests or shared values. Once the common enemy had been decisively 
defeated, it was only natural that rival interests and rival ideologies came to the fore.  
Within the Grand Alliance there were from the very beginning substantial tensions between 
imperial Britain and the anti-imperialist administration of Franklin Roosevelt, in addition to the more 
obvious sources of contention between the capitalist United States and United Kingdom on the one 
hand and the communist USSR on the other. For these very reasons Roosevelt had been concerned 
that a wartime discussion of post-conflict aims might strain the anti-Nazi coalition and thereby weaken 
Allied military cooperation. In this he was no doubt correct; the flaw in his analysis is that while such 
matters could be postponed, they could not be avoided altogether.
2 When finally addressed after the 
collapse of Germany, the terms of the resulting political and occasionally military conflict were 
initially quite unfavourable to the western partners. The context was one of massive withdrawal of US 
military forces while Russian forces continued to occupy much of central, eastern, and southern 
Europe. Such circumstances were hardly conducive to effective bargaining, and the Soviets were 
increasingly bold in both their demands and their actions. But the very fact of Russian military 
preponderance on the continent helped spur a balancing effort; thus at the same time that Russian 
military power was consolidating control over various puppet governments within the Kremlin’s new 
sphere of influence, an anti-Soviet alliance emerged, albeit in fits and starts, based on the principle of 
collective defence against any further geographical expansion of Moscow’s military presence.
3  
                                                      
1   On the emergence and dynamics of the anti-Nazi coalition, see Winston Churchill 1950. The Grand Alliance. New York: 
Houghton-Miflin. 
2   A point emphasized by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 394-422, 
especially p. 405. 
3   The literature on the origins of the Cold War is immense. For an overview, see John Lewis Gaddis 1972. The United 
States and the Origins of the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press; and Gaddis 1997. We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press. On the complex politics of intra-NATO relations, see 
Marc Trachtenberg 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press; and Georges-Henri Soutou 1996. L’Alliance Incertaine: Les Rapports Politico-
Stratégiques Franco-Allemands, 1954-1996. Paris: Fayard. On the continuously precarious politics of the anti-Soviet 
alliance, see Geir Lundestad 2003. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
as well as his contribution to this volume. David M. Andrews 
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This new alliance, though initially built on delicate foundations, eventually developed 
characteristics that allowed it to become remarkably enduring. Not only did the western allies share a 
common foe in the Soviet Union, to a very substantial extent they shared common values and common 
interests. The foundations of this community of interests can be traced back at least to World War 
Two. Then, despite the tensions between Washington and London previously mentioned, there were 
substantial efforts—beginning with the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 through the 
series of wartime conferences aimed at designing a framework for post-war political and economic 
relations systems—to develop a shared moral foundation to the anti-Nazi campaign.
4 The Allies self-
consciously engaged their Axis foes in a battle of rival ideologies, a battle that both reflected and 
reinforced the clash of arms.
5  
Likewise after the war, the great and remarkably successful experiments in converting Japan and 
western Germany into functioning democracies were fundamental to the construction of a politically 
durable anti-Soviet alliance. This was especially true in the case of the Federal Republic, since the 
recent victims of Nazi aggression across western Europe had to be persuaded to accept not only the 
political but eventually the partial military revival of a German state.
6 The institutions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization were a critical aspect of this transformation, and a key to the sometimes 
reluctant agreement of Bonn’s neighbours to countenance German rearmament.
7 In addition to these 
shared political and security interests, the NATO partners and especially the members of the incipient 
European Community were coupled together by numerous economic ties, ties that were carefully 
nurtured and grew ever more dense with the passage of time.
8  
It should hardly be surprising, then, that this new alliance proved much more enduring than the old 
anti-Nazi pact. Especially within the Atlantic community, the geopolitical imperative of balancing 
Soviet power went largely hand in hand with the more liberal objectives of democracy promotion and 
the construction of international institutions aimed at facilitating cooperation and shared prosperity 
                                                      
4   Indeed one of the motivations for the Bretton Woods conference was to counter Nazi propaganda concerning the new 
European order that the Third Reich would usher in. Consider for example this extract from the ‘Preliminary Draft 
Proposal for a United Nations Stablization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and 
Associated Nations,’ or White Plan, written in April 1942: ‘…serious discussion of specific proposals […] will be a 
factor toward winning the war… The people of the anti-Axis powers […] must be assured that something will be done in 
the sphere of international economic relations that is new, that is powerful enough and comprehensive enough to give 
expectation of successfully filling a world need. Whether within the Axis countries the will to fight would be weakened 
by such arrangements is not certain, but assuredly it would not be strengthened […] if there is real promise that an 
orderly prosperous world will emerge from a United Nations victory.’ In J. Keith Horsefield (ed.) 1969. The International 
Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Volume III: Documents. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, pp. 38-39. 
5   Roosevelt’s efforts to include Stalin as a partner in this shared moral crusade, as for example in his characterization of the 
Soviet leader as ‘Uncle Joe,’ were decidedly less successful. For a clear precedent, see Woodrow Wilson’s remarks about 
Russia in his War Message of 2 April 1917. Wilson, War Messages, 65th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Doc. No. 5, 
Serial No. 7264, Washington, D.C., 1917, pp. 3-8.  
6   On the democratic transformation of western Germany, see participants’ accounts in Carl Friedrich and Associates 1948. 
American Experiences in Military Government in World War II. New York: Rinehart; and Lucius Clay 1950. Decision in 
Germany. New York: Doubleday. More scholarly accounts are available in John Gimbel 1970. The American Occupation 
of Germany. Stanford: Stanford University Press; and Klaus-Dieter Henke 1995. Die Amerikanische Besetzung 
Deutschlands. Munich: Oldenbourg. For a comparison of western Germany’s political reconstruction and the 
incorporation of the German Democratic Republic into the FRG some forty years later, see Wade Jacoby 2000. Imitation 
and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. On Japan’s postwar 
reconstruction, see John Dower 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: Norton. 
7   Trachtenberg 1999, supra note 3; Soutou 1996, supra note 3.  
8   On the role of the United States in promoting European integration in these early years, see Geir Lundestad 1998. 
‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press. On 
varying national strategies within Europe during the early years of postwar integration, compare John Gillingham 1991. 
Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Alan Milward 1992. 
The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge. The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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within the West.
9 Thus for half a century the realism of Theodore Roosevelt was married to the 
idealism of Woodrow Wilson, a union that survived (if only barely, on occasion) many a crisis.
10 But 
could it survive success? 
During the early and middle 1980s, the mounting internal weakness of the Soviet state combined 
with the rise to power of a relatively young and daring Communist leader to produce a series of 
dramatic changes in both the Kremlin’s internal and external policies.
11 Perestroika and glasnost were 
followed by a remarkable loosening of Moscow’s grip over its satellite states in central and eastern 
Europe. On November 9, 1989, the chief symbol of the Cold War conflict in Europe, the Berlin Wall, 
was dismantled. Two years later, on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist, 
heralding the end of the bipolar system of international relations that had characterized the preceding 
four decades.
12  
Thus fifty years (almost to the day) after Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States removed 
the last impediment to the foundation of a global anti-Nazi coalition, the object of the succeeding anti-
Soviet pact quietly self-destructed. But whereas the collapse of Hitler’s Germany led directly and 
almost immediately to the end of the anti-Nazi pact—an alliance that had never been more than a 
marriage of convenience, despite Roosevelt’s fervent wishes—the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet 
Union did not lead in parallel fashion to the rapid demise of the anti-Soviet alliance. This fact alone 
bears testimony to the much deeper ties binding the Cold War partners, allies that shared not only a 
common enemy but to a large degree a common purpose, than those binding together the members of 
the Grand Alliance.  
Nevertheless, the disappearance of their mutual foe did eventually and inevitably loosen at least 
some of the many ties binding the post-war Atlantic partners. The international environment had 
become ‘permissive’ to a degree that was unknown during the Cold War, at least within the two rival 
blocs, and previous certainties now rested on much shakier foundations. At no point was this systemic 
change more evident than when the president of a post-Soviet Russian state and the chancellor of a 
reunified Germany, joined by the president of France, announced their common ambition to thwart a 
principal aim of American diplomacy. The context was the final preparations for a war to dislodge 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power, an action that Washington had described as of supreme 
importance. The joint statement of Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schroeder, and Jacques Chirac on March 
5, 2003, opposing this action
13 echoed back to much earlier periods in European politics, including the 
                                                      
9   For accounts emphasizing the role of international institutions and multilateral cooperation in the emergence of the 
Atlantic order, see John Ikenberry 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; and John Gerald Ruggie (ed.) 1993 Multilateralism Matters: 
The Theory and Practice of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press, especially the chapters by 
Anne-Marie Burley, Judith Goldstein, Steve Weber, and Patrick Morgan. 
10  Kissinger 1994, supra note 2, at pp. 29-55 emphasizes Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as representative of 
alternative approaches to American foreign policy, as does Ruggie in his 1997 article ‘The Past as Prologue? Interests, 
Identity, and American Foreign Policy’, International Security, 21(4), pp. 89-125. Walter Russell Mead and Richard C. 
Leone employ a variant of this approach in their 2002 book Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It 
Changed the World. New York: Routledge. On the continuously precarious politics of the anti-Soviet alliance, see Geir 
Lundestad 2003. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
11  On the influence of Mikhail Gorbachev on the course of Russian and international history, see David Remnick 1994. 
Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire. New York: Vintage Books. 
12  On the Cold War’s endgame, see Elizabeth Pond 1993. Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution; and Philip Zeilikow and Condoleezza Rice 1997. Germany Unified and Europe 
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press. 
13   ‘Joint Declaration By Russia, Germany And France On Iraq’. [Online]. Le ministère des affaires étrangères (French 
Foreign Ministry), Paris, 10 February 2003, available on: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/actu.gb.asp?DOS=12633. David M. Andrews 
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nineteenth century’s so-called ‘Holy Alliance’—a fact that was not lost on leaders in central and 
eastern Europe recently liberated from Soviet domination.
14 But in the context of the ‘Long Peace’ of 
the Cold War,
15 an anti-American coalition of Paris, Berlin and Moscow axis was not at all familiar; it 
was hardly even imaginable.  
Was this development, so extraordinary in the context of the previous half century of transatlantic 
politics, an aberration or a harbinger? Had the collapse of the Soviet Union really been a death 
sentence for the Atlantic alliance as well—a death sentence that was merely delayed, not averted, by 
the West’s deep ties? This essay frames those questions and provides some initial responses, focusing 
on the effects of structural change on the grand strategy of the United States and especially on US 
relations with France and Germany. 
That framing argument can be summarized briefly as follows. The transatlantic relationship in the 
wake of World War Two rested on an implicit bargain or exchange, and a complex intermeshing of 
interests that helped sustain that bargain. This bargain and its sustaining interests proved the vital core 
of the global struggle against the Soviet Union, a struggle that was ultimately successful; but the very 
success of these efforts altered the circumstances of the transatlantic bargain, and thereby undermined 
the strategic equilibrium that had previously sustained the Atlantic framework. For roughly a decade 
after the Cold War’s end, the confluence of several mitigating factors conspired to mask the magnitude 
of these changes; as a result, the full extent of this systemic shift is only now becoming clear. But even 
before the diplomatic crisis that preceded the 2003 war in Iraq, it was clear that the Atlantic bargain 
was under enormous stress.  
The Post-War Atlantic Bargain 
Given the preponderance of American power at the end of World War Two, it seems appropriate to 
begin a description of the post-war Atlantic bargain with a discussion of US policy objectives in the 
early post-war years. The newly sworn-in President Harry S. Truman inherited from his predecessor a 
pledge to prosecute the war against the Axis powers until their unconditional surrender, together with 
a series of commitments to form an interlocking set of broadly multilateral institutions aimed at the 
cooperative governance of post-war international political and economic affairs; these latter 
organizations included the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
World Bank. Truman did not inherit, however, a framework for continued American involvement in 
European security arrangements, and he initially had no more intention of offering to participate in 
such than did FDR. Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary had drawn up plans for the permanent 
deindustrialization of Germany, the state that was still officially regarded as the most likely source of 
threat to post-war security, and the Truman administration showed every indication that it would 
pursue this option. Only the deteriorating relationship with the Soviets, highlighted by challenges to 
pro-western governments in south-eastern Europe, the brutal installation of communist governments in 
(Contd.)                                                                   
There was a follow-up trilateral memorandum on 24 February and a joint statement by the three countries’ foreign 
ministers on 5 March 2003; these documents are available at the same site. 
14  Of course the Holy Alliance did not include France, composed instead of tsarist Russia, autocratic Prussia and imperial 
Austria, but among its characteristics was the joint management of smaller European states’ affairs. Central and eastern 
European fears that the emerging Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis would echo certain features of this earlier system were 
catalyzed by French President Jacques Chirac’s 17 February 2003 outburst directed at the candidates for European Union 
membership that had publicly rejected the Franco-German position on Iraq (Chirac’s comments are not reported on the 
Iraq conflict web page of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères but were widely reported in the press). For a thoughtful 
expression of these concerns, see Andrzej Kapiszewski 2003. In Europe, With America: Poland 2003. Krakow: 
Jagiellonian University School of Polish Language and Culture, especially pp. 17-22; see also Ryszard Steplowski 2003. 
‘Towards the EU-US Hegemonic Tandem?’, in: The EU-US Cooperation. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International 
Affairs, pp. 97-104, especially p. 99.  
15  John Lewis Gaddis 1989. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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central and eastern Europe, and the increasingly strained four-power arrangements in occupied 
Germany sufficed to change this plan.
16  
While it took a while for the Truman administration to agree on a grand strategy, when it 
eventually did so it was with gusto. Containment of Soviet expansionism became the principal 
objective, and multiple methods were employed to that end. Understood in the broadest sense, 
containment had both a military component and an economic component; in Europe, the military 
component was NATO and the economic component was the Marshall Plan. This combination was 
intended to deter the Soviets from military adventurism (because of collective self defence) while 
denying victory at the ballot box to Moscow’s sympathizers (because of the success of western 
European economic recovery). Future US administrations pursued policies that were largely consistent 
with these general principles, even if they involved occasional reconfigurations of the framework that 
informed alliance management. 
What was the substance of that framework? At the most general level, the Cold War Atlantic 
partnership always involved an implicit exchange: Europe extended legitimacy to US foreign policy 
activism (what is now called unilateralism) around the world, and in return the US offered its support, 
or at least its acceptance, of various arrangements guaranteeing European regional security and 
prosperity, even if these arrangements disproportionately benefited its allies. These arrangements were 
not limited to NATO but extended instead to trade arrangements under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international monetary and financial arrangements through the IMF and 
auxiliary groupings, and support for European integration. While the details of these arrangements 
varied, the underlying agreement proved robust and remained in place throughout the Cold War. 
The earliest scholarly articulation of this overarching bargain was made by Benjamin Cohen in 
1974. Cohen argued that:  
The Europeans acquiesced in a system which accorded the United States special privileges to act 
abroad unilaterally to promote US interests. The United States, in turn, condoned Europe’s use of 
the system to promote its own regional prosperity, even if this happened to come largely at the 
expense of the United States.
17 
In other words, Europe might disagree with American foreign policy but it would not seek to 
undermine it; and in return the United States maintained its support for security and economic 
arrangements that resulted in disproportionate benefits for its Atlantic partners.
18 It bears noting that 
Cohen formulated this analysis in the wake of the unilateral transformation of international economic 
and monetary relations announced by the Nixon administration in August 1971, a transformation he 
                                                      
16  For an overview of FDR’s postwar European strategy and the evolution of American policy under Harry Truman, see 
Kissinger 1994, supra note 2, at pp. 369-445, and Trachtenberg 1999, supra note 3, at pp. 3-145. 
17  Benjamin Jerry Cohen 1974. ‘The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck’, in: Wolfram 
Hanreider (ed.), The United States and Western Europe: Political, Economic and Strategic Perspectives. Cambridge, 
M.A.: Winthrop Press (reprinted in Cohen 1990. Crossing Frontiers: Explorations in International Political Economy. 
Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, pp. 94-124; quote from p. 106). David Calleo later developed an argument along similar 
lines in his 1982 work The Imperious Economy. Cambridge, M.S.: Harvard University Press. 
18  Thus for example the United States, though continuously pressuring the member states of the European Community to 
liberalize their agricultural policies throughout the Cold War, never withdrew its fundamental support for European 
economic integration despite the fact that a core element of the Community’s economic policies (the Common 
Agricultural Policy) was both illiberal and protectionist. On the continuity of American support for European integration, 
see again Lundestad 1998; for an analysis rich in archival sources of the difficulties the US government encountered in 
negotiating agricultural reform with the incipient European Economic Community, see Lucia Coppolaro (forthcoming 
2004) The United States of America and the European Community in the GATT Negotiations of the Kennedy Round, 
1964-67. Thesis (PhD). European University Institute. David M. Andrews 
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described as ‘revolutionary.’
19 But the aim of Nixon and Kissinger was to rebalance the costs and 
benefits of these overall arrangements, not to overturn their fundamental premises, and the Alliance 
managed to weather this storm (and others) without coming apart.  
The reasons for European interest in American security guarantees were more or less self-evident 
(although I will spell out certain particulars below); after all, the Soviet colossus was at western 
Europe’s doorstep, not America’s. But why the equally intense American interest in European 
legitimization of US foreign policy? Doubtless there are multiple reasons, including the simple desire 
for the approval of one’s peers.
20 But there was a more instrumental reason as well that bears 
exploration in some detail. 
The Alliance’s Sustaining Equilibrium  
Central to the overall political bargain described above was the military dimension of the Atlantic 
alliance, and here the strategic calculations were quite complex. Simply put, the stability of the 
Atlantic partnership during the Cold War rested upon an unusual balance between the interests of three 
of its four most significant members: the US, Germany, and France.
21 To better understand this, we 
have to re-examine the characteristics of the Cold War Alliance more closely, and here we can do little 
better than to begin with Lord Ismay’s famous dictum about the purpose of NATO. The Alliance’s 
first Secretary General reportedly said that the organization’s function was ‘to keep the Russians out, 
the Americans in, and the Germans down.’
22  
Ismay’s formulation is not only succinct and insightful; it is increasingly borne out by the archival 
evidence. The first element of Ismay’s triad, keeping the Russians out, is of course the most obvious: 
NATO was an anti-Soviet alliance. But the second and third elements—keeping the Americans in and 
the Germans down—were of central importance as well. In the most comprehensive study of the 
official documents of the period, Marc Trachtenberg concludes that the division of Europe after World 
War Two, painful as it was for the peoples of central and eastern Europe within the Soviet sphere of 
influence, was nevertheless broadly stable. The western powers and the USSR were, again broadly 
speaking, prepared to allow each other a free hand to act on their respective sides of the line of 
demarcation. But there was one major exception to this rule: the Soviets were not prepared to let West 
Germany become too strong or too independent. Such an outcome—especially a politically 
independent and nuclear-armed West Germany—would have been sufficiently provocative to prompt 
an armed response from Moscow.
23 
The principal task of the early Cold War years, therefore, was to enmesh the Federal Republic 
squarely into western security and economic systems in a manner that satisfied not only the United 
States and its western European allies (meaning in this case especially France) but that was 
furthermore acceptable to the Soviet Union. Keeping ‘the Americans in’ and ‘the Germans down’ was 
therefore not secondary to keeping ‘the Russians out’: it was the central means by which the Russians 
were persuaded to stay out.  
Once this central task had been accomplished—and it was not fully accomplished until the mid-
1960s—a second abiding political problem of the transatlantic relationship emerged: Franco-American 
                                                      
19  Cohen, 1974/1990, supra note 17, (title and pp. 94 and 100). 
20  For a discussion of why similar considerations failed to obtain, at least to the same degree, in Asia, see Peter Katzenstein 
1996. (ed.) The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. 
21  The other essential partner was of course the United Kingdom, but especially after 1956 successive British governments 
defined their interests in close parallel to those of the United States; more on this below. 
22  Scholars have not been able to verify whether Ismay actually made this statement, but whether he did so or not the astute 
analysis is widely attributed to him. 
23  Trachtenberg 1999, supra note 3. The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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rivalry. France emerged from the Second World War as a much reduced political power, but retained 
global aspirations in a way that the nascent Federal Republic of Germany could not, and that the 
United Kingdom did not. French leaders conceived of France as not merely a rival power but a rival 
civilization, in sharp contrast to the Anglo-Saxon civilization aligning London and Washington. Little 
wonder, then, that—especially after Suez—a recurrent tendency of French foreign policy was to aim at 
balancing, rather than complementing, the influence of the United States. And while this competitive 
impulse was most pronounced in the policies of de Gaulle, it has been evident in every French 
president since the founding of the Fifth Republic. Pompidou was bitterly frustrated that his efforts to 
restore Franco-American cordiality after de Gaulle’s resignation were met not with enhanced status for 
Paris in Washington, but instead by the Nixon administration’s policy of promoting a tight bipolar 
framework. Giscard was put off both by Carter’s moralizing tone and his apparent strategic indecision. 
Mitterrand would have been only too happy to retire NATO to the ash heap of history following the 
end of the Cold War.
24  
In short, former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine’s desire to balance the American 
‘hyperpower’ has a long pedigree.
25 Despite these recurrent tensions, however, three factors tended to 
mitigate Franco-American rivalry during the Cold War. The first was self-restraint on the part of 
France, which profited handsomely from the American security guarantee (against both the Soviets 
and the Germans). The second was self-restraint on the part of successive US governments, who 
regarded NATO as the leading security arrangement, and Europe as the most important theatre of 
operations, of the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. It bears reiterating why they formed this 
judgment. The simultaneous rearmament and pacification of Germany—its continued entrenchment 
within western military structures, including the absence of a genuinely independent German foreign 
policy—was a key to avoiding armed conflict with the Soviet Union. And continued German 
pacification depended in large measure on Franco-German reconciliation, undertaken partly within the 
context of NATO and partly within the context of European integration. Thus while French 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command had no apparent impact on the overall balance 
of power between the United States and the Soviet Union,
26 it was nevertheless considered a political 
crisis of the highest order. And while American administrations were periodically exercised by French 
policy, given the centrality of the Atlantic alliance it was normally accommodation, not confrontation, 
that was the order of the day.  
This brings us to the third and final mitigating factor on Franco-American rivalry: the restraining 
influence exercised by the Federal Republic of Germany on French policy. The global aspirations of 
successive French governments depended on French leadership of a European community of nation-
states—leadership that officials in Bonn were, for the most part, prepared to cede. Such a concession 
was, after all, a centrepiece of the original Community bargain, and part of Adenauer’s vision of long-
term rehabilitation of Germany into the international community.
27 But Bonn was far more 
constrained by the Cold War than was Paris, and realization of the Federal Republic’s dual objectives 
of security (in the present) and unification (in the future) depended on a careful balancing of political 
relations with Paris and with Washington. German reliance on the US security guarantee, and equally 
importantly the promise of American support for eventual reunification with the GDR, constituted an 
                                                      
24  For an account exploiting extensive access to French primary sources to discuss both this general tendency and these 
particular developments, see Soutou 1996, supra note 3.  
25    Hubert Vedrine with Dominique Moïsi 2001. France in an Age of Globalization. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. Translation by Philip H. Gordon. 
26  As noted by Kenneth N. Waltz in Waltz 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., p. 169. 
27 On Adenauer’s foreign policy, see Christian Hacke 1997. Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Berlin: Ullstein. For the French side of this equation, see Soutou 1996, supra note 3. David M. Andrews 
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important buffer on the sometimes latent, sometimes active French tendency to conceive of geopolitics 
in anti-American terms. 
The result of these interlocking interests was a stable if continuously tense constellation of 
relationships among the western allies. Keeping the Russians out necessitated keeping the Germans 
down by keeping the Americans in—and this despite the desire of significant political factions in the 
United States, Germany and France to repatriate American military forces. Successive German 
governments came to accept this policy, even if they did not always warmly embrace it (and 
sometimes tested it at the margins).
28 But during the Cold War no German government ever rejected 
this policy outright, and even passive acceptance of the American presence meant resisting, and 
thereby restraining, the most virulently anti-American strains of French strategic thought.  
In short, a complex equilibrium of interests between Paris, Bonn and Washington helped preserve 
the Atlantic alliance, even when aspects of its underlying framework were questioned in each of these 
capitals. And inasmuch as the British government chose to throw in its lot with the United States 
following Suez, London likewise had a very strong vested interest in the success of this transatlantic 
ménage-à-trois, often playing a crucial role in facilitating the resolution of disputes among the 
Atlantic partners.
29 The resulting balance, though crisis prone, nevertheless proved enduring. 
But a further point bears underlining as well, especially in light of recent tensions, and that was the 
role of alliance management in American grand strategy during this period. Once the United States 
become committed to a long-term policy of deterrence and containment, Washington’s grand strategy 
necessitated active attention to alliance management within NATO. Deterring the Soviets was not only 
a contest of rival wills and capabilities: it also required close attention to the special role of Germany, 
and because of that to the rest of Europe. Alliance management was not a secondary concern of US 
grand strategy during the Cold War, it was part and parcel of that strategy. 
The End of the Cold War: muted effects  
Of course if the complex series of relationships described above was driven primarily by the 
geopolitical logic of balancing Soviet power, then the end of the Cold War should have changed 
everything. For with the Cold War’s end, and especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the chief reason for the Atlantic alliance—to provide security against a hostile superpower actively 
bent on expansion—no longer existed. As a consequence, the strategic rationale that underpinned the 
Atlantic bargain was no longer operative. From Washington’s perspective, Europe would no longer be 
the geographical focus of US geopolitical concerns nor would NATO likely become the primary 
vehicle for achieving American political and military objectives elsewhere. In Berlin, the previously 
tight constraints on German foreign policy should have been relaxed; and in Paris the buffers on 
Franco-American rivalry should have been removed. In short, the whole strategic basis of the 
transatlantic relationship should have come undone. 
Theorists of international relations from the ‘realist’ school therefore predicted, and awaited, the 
Alliance’s imminent collapse.
30 Their reasoning was simple: no common threat, no common 
purpose—such was the lesson of history, repeated again and again. For a variety of reasons, however, 
                                                      
28 On Germany’s complex relationship with the United States during this period, see Hubert Zimmermann 2002. Money and 
Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
29 For a cogent critique of this policy, see Roderic Braithwaite 2003. ‘End of the affair’, Prospect, May. 
30 Powerful early statements along these lines came from John J. Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. See J. Mearsheimer 
1990. ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1), pp. 5-55; K. Waltz 
1993. ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, 18(2), pp. 44-79. For a later analysis 
with good references to the ensuing debate see K. Waltz 2000. ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International 
Security, 25(1), pp. 5-41. The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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the anticipated collapse of the alliance did not take place (at least not at that point). Why not? Perhaps 
because prior strategic alliances had not shared the democratic affinities of the NATO partners, which 
doubtless also tended to mitigate any rivalry among them following the demise of the Soviet Union.
31 
Perhaps because NATO’s continued existence constituted a sort of tacit insurance against the 
possibility of a revival of Russian militarism, a factor weighed especially heavily in official thinking in 
the states that were soon to become candidates for NATO entry.
32 And perhaps simply because of 
inertia: institutions such as NATO exhibit a substantial tendency towards continuity, even when their 
founding purpose evaporates.
33 More generally, it often takes time to make sense of important 
changes. Thus French policy at the end of World War Two was initially to strike anti-German 
alliances, and only later to recognize the Soviet threat; likewise it was not until 1947-48 that American 
policy became firmly oriented towards containment of communist expansion, as discussed previously. 
But NATO’s durability was not only the result of institutional robustness and attitudinal inertia. In 
addition, the favourable confluence of a number of temporary conditions combined to mitigate, at least 
temporarily, the effects on the Alliance of the Cold War’s successful termination. Not least amongst 
these mitigating factors was the election of a US president in 1992 who was supremely able to 
persuade his European interlocutors that he understood and agreed with them, even while pursuing 
policies that were extremely difficult for the America’s partners to accept. These policies included 
plans to dramatically enlarge NATO membership, an aim pursued vigorously by the Clinton administration.
34  
In addition, the military conflicts that arose during the 1990s—the campaign against Saddam 
Hussein in 1991 and later the Balkans wars—tended to distract attention from the underlying changes 
in the Atlantic partnership. Consider policy towards the Middle East, normally a ‘focus of discord’ 
between the United States and its European partners.
35 But Saddam’s inept diplomacy, followed by 
George Bush Sr.’s extraordinary efforts to marshal international opinion against Baghdad, resulted in 
an unprecedented display of not only western but global solidarity against a regional villain.
36 
Likewise the Balkans wars, ugly as they were, were extremely convenient for NATO’s post-Soviet 
evolution.
37 The purpose of NATO intervention was not collective self defence, and hence 
participation in these campaigns was traumatic for some member states—especially Germany. On the 
other hand, the geographical focus (not to mention the historical parallel to Nazi atrocities) was 
                                                      
31 Michael W. Doyle is most responsible for the revival of the democratic peace thesis, see for example Doyle 1986. ‘Kant: 
Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80(4), pp. 1151-1169. 
32 For example, Kapiszewski 2003, supra note 14. 
33 For a general argument on the durability of international institutions, see Robert O. Keohane 1984. After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. For a specific 
application to NATO, see Celeste A. Wallander 2000. ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, 
International Organization, 54(4), pp. 705-735. 
34 This despite the fact that a clear majority of American experts opposed NATO enlargement on strategic grounds, 
especially with respect the Baltic states; see for example Gaddis’ condemnation of the policy in his 1998 article ‘History, 
Grand Strategy, and NATO Enlargement’, Survival, 40(1), pp. 145-151. For a defense of the policy, see Ronald D. 
Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee 1993. ‘Building a New NATO’, Foreign Affairs, 72(4), 28-40. 
35 William Wallace and Costanza Musu 2003. ‘The Focus of Discord? The Middle East in US Strategy and European 
Aspirations,’ in: John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations After 2000. 
London: Routledge. 
36 See for example the account in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh 1993. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy 
and War in the New World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
37 This is not to deny the severe challenges that these conflicts posed for the Alliance. For insiders’ assessments, see Wesley 
K. Clark 2002. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. New York: Public Affairs; Richard 
Holbrooke 1999. To End a War. New York: Modern Library; Wesley Clark and David Owen 1996. Balkan Odyssey. 
New York: Harcourt Brace.  David M. Andrews 
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sufficiently close to ease these Alliance members’ lingering concerns, and in a remarkably short 
period the Federal Republic shifted from a purely defensive military posture to becoming one of the 
world’s chief suppliers of troops for foreign combat duty.
38 At the same time, the temporary absence 
of rival hotspots elsewhere in the globe allowed the United States to focus on NATO enlargement and 
transformation, changes aimed at adapting the alliance to what appeared to be the major security 
challenge of the post-Cold War era: containing ethnic rivalries, especially in the former Soviet sphere of influence.  
In relatively short order NATO was converted, in the words of Barry Posen, from a unidirectional 
defensive force into an omnidirectional offensive force, a force capable of projection either to deter or 
to decisively resist ethnic warfare. This radical transformation should have been enormously difficult, 
but permissive circumstances made it possible. Indeed, in retrospect these permissive circumstances—
the geographical proximity of the first tests of the new doctrine to NATO’s homeland, the relative 
absence of rival hot spots to preoccupy American leadership, and the general preoccupation with ethnic 
conflict—rendered NATO expansion and transformation relatively easy, even if it did not seem so at the time. 
Finally, one additional factor helped mask the inherent strains within the Alliance: the slow 
evolution of US grand strategy. Despite American leadership on NATO’s transformation, no clear 
formulation of a new general philosophy towards global security was evident during the Clinton 
years.
39 This subdued pace of change further reduced pressure on the Alliance. Nevertheless, there was 
evidence that already afoot, well before 9-11, that American understanding of the strategic relationship 
with the Europeans had changed, even among Atlanticists, and that this changed conception boded ill 
for a stable relationship. 
The evolution of US grand strategy in the 1990s can be characterized in terms of two parallel 
discussions regarding security policy that took place more or less simultaneously in the academy and 
in leading American think tanks. The first debate concerned the bases and implications of US power 
preponderance after the Cold War. The second was more narrowly focused on the military lessons of 
the 1991 Gulf war, Somalia, and the Balkans conflicts; hence the questions were more technically 
defined, for example in terms of the relative significance of air power versus land power. While 
obviously interrelated, these two conversations took place largely independently of one another; my 
remarks here will be largely confined to the first of these two debates.
40 
America’s sudden power preponderance—the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar distribution of 
military power, with only one superpower surviving the Cold War—gave raise to two questions: 
whether American military dominance was likely to prove enduring or ephemeral, and—closely 
related—where the major threats to American security lay. On the first question, analysts varied 
between arguing that American primacy was likely to prove both enduring and beneficial;
41 that 
primacy was threatened but beneficial, and therefore worth preserving;
42 that eventual American 
                                                      
38 On this remarkable transformation, see the discussion by Hubert Zimmermann in this volume. 
39 See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross 1996/1997. ‘Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy’, International Security, 
21(3), pp. 5-53, especially pp. 5-6 and 44-50. 
40 I will, however, note that American analysts involved in this second, more technical debate were deeply concerned about 
the difficulties of conducting an effective military operation without clear lines of command. The sustained discussion on 
this topic helps explain the resonance of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s later dictum that the mission should 
determine the coalition, not the reverse, despite the fact that this formulation elevated a tactical principle to the level of strategy. 
41 This view gained greater ascendancy late in the decade. See, for example, William C. Wohlforth 1999. ‘The Stability of a 
Unipolar World’, International Security, 21(1), pp. 1-36. 
42 There were two predominant variants of this argument, quite at odds with one another in terms of their policy 
prescriptions. The first such variant, championed by many American neoconservatives, held that potential rivals to 
American pre-eminence needed to be intimidated; the second variant, advocated both by traditional realists and some 
liberal internationalist theorists, held that potential rivals needed to have their fears of American pre-eminence assuaged. 
The Draft Policy Guidance produced by the first Bush administration’s Defense Department in March 1992 is an example The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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decline was inevitable, and therefore we should be preparing for a stable transition to a multipolar 
world;
43 and that withdrawal from an active role in international affairs was in order.
44 The answers to 
the second question (regarding the nature of future security threats) also varied sharply, with some 
analysts pointing to threats from a resurgent Russia;
45 others to emerging powers (typically China);
46 
some to America’s former allies (including the European Union);
47 still others to rogue states, 
especially those armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and finally those who pointed to 
non-state terrorist networks, fuelled by anti-Western ideologies and rendered increasingly capable of 
inflicting harm by the global diffusion of technology. 
Limitations of space do not permit a thorough examination of how this debate evolved. Suffice it to 
say that by the end of the 1990s, most analysts were persuaded that threats to American primacy, if 
any, were at best distant;
48 on the other hand, debates about the nature of those threats continued to 
rage unabated. Despite these differences, what was increasingly plain was that alliance management 
and, in closely related fashion, America’s involvement in international organizations would play 
different roles in future US foreign policy than they had in the past. No longer was there the sharp 
disciplining effect associated with a rival superpower threatening nuclear war if America’s alliance 
management proved unsatisfactory. As a consequence, even the strongest advocates of preserving and 
further developing America’s commitment to international institutions were obliged to argue that the 
function of these commitments was to augment American power and influence rather than to avert nuclear war.
49  
In short, the passing of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union meant that the United 
States had greater liberty with respect to its foreign commitments than at any time in the preceding 
half century. Attention to alliance management could be justified on a number of strategic grounds, 
but it was no longer a geopolitical imperative in the same sense that it had been during the Cold War. 
It was in this context that the second Bush administration assumed office in January 2001. 
(Contd.)                                                                   
of the first variant; see ‘Extracts from Pentagon’s Plan: “Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival”’, New York Times, 8 
March 1992.  
43 For example, Christopher Layne 1993. ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise’, International 
Security, 17(4), pp. 5-51. 
44 While this perspective had little appeal within the academy (Eric Nordlinger being the chief exception), it did resonate 
with a segment of the American population. Nordlinger 1995. Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a 
New Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
45 For example, Henry Kissinger 1994. ‘Expand NATO Now’, Washington Post, 19 December; Zbigniew Brzezinski 1992. 
‘The Premature Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, 73(2), pp. 67-82. 
46 This was certainly one of the leitmotifs of foreign policy discussion within the administration of George W. Bush prior to 
9-11. For example, shortly prior to the election of 2000 the future National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, wrote 
that ‘For America and our allies, the most daunting task is to find the right balance in our policy toward Russia and 
China.’ The next seven paragraphs dealt exclusively with China. Rice 2000. ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign 
Affairs, 79(1), pp. 45-62. For an earlier formulation of this concern, see Zalmay Khalizad 1995. From Containment to 
Global Leadership? American and the World After the Cold War. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, especially p. 30. 
47 This was originally an outlier position; see for example Jeffrey T. Bergner 1991. The New Superpowers: Germany, Japan, 
the U.S. and the New World Order. New York: St. Martin’s Press. It has since become more respectable; see Charles A. 
Kupchan 2002. ‘The End of the West’, The Atlantic Monthly, 290(4), pp. 42-44. 
48 The 2002 publication by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlworth of ‘American Primacy in Perspective’ in Foreign 
Affairs, 81(4), pp. 20-33, summarizing and popularizing their own earlier work on the subject, was a bellwether. 
49 For example, Joseph S. Nye 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It 
Alone. New York: Oxford University Press. David M. Andrews 
12  EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/08 © 2004 David M. Andrews 
The Alliance under Stress 
To summarize the preceding section, for roughly a decade the happy conjuncture of a number of 
essentially random events helped mitigate the effects of the Cold War’s end. These temporary factors, 
together with more enduring institutional characteristics that likewise contributed to NATO’s 
durability, for a time trumped the effects of underlying structural divergence. But this simply meant 
that the effects of structural divergence were delayed, not averted altogether. Furthermore, the 
situation was later reversed, especially following the terrorist attacks of September 2001 on New York 
and Washington: temporary conditions now drew attention to the changed structure of Atlantic 
interests rather than away from them. Among these conditions was George W. Bush’s election in 2000 
and Saddam’s far more successful diplomatic gambits of the late 1990s and early 21
st century, as 
opposed to his adventures of the early 1990s. 
Of course strains within the Alliance were evident prior to 9-11, and even prior to the second Bush 
presidency. The Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and other initiatives—many of them 
emanating in large part from Europe—were bound to test the Atlantic framework, regardless of the 
American administration of the day. True, the Bush team’s handling of these issues, even when 
justifiable in substantive terms, was unnecessarily clumsy and thus contributed to an environment 
where ‘payback’ was on the minds of normally friendly governments around the world.
50 These, 
however, were exacerbating circumstances, not the source of the transatlantic bargain’s eventual demise.  
For the events of 2002-3 plainly testified that the old bargain had come to an end. Recall the core 
terms of that bargain: European governments agreed to legitimize American foreign policy in 
exchange for the United States underwriting European prosperity and security. By the time that the 
United States, joined by the United Kingdom and with the diplomatic support of a handful of other 
states, decided to invade Iraq in March of 2003, this longstanding agreement was in tatters. In the 
preceding weeks the governments of France and Germany had decisively rejected its core terms; 
indeed, they threatened to undermine public support for US policy within their own polities unless the 
United States changed its behaviour. The Bush administration angrily responded that it had no 
intention of changing its stance, and that it did not require the support of either European publics or 
their governments in either the formulation or execution of its policies.
51  
Why had support for the old arrangement collapsed? During the weeks and months following the 
short military campaign in the Middle East, governments that both supported and opposed the war had 
ample opportunity to reflect on this question. To begin with, Paris and Berlin realized (much to their 
dismay) that threats to undermine European public support for American policy had lost much of their 
previous traction. Absent the interlocking concerns that united Washington and Moscow in supporting 
a substantial armed American presence in Germany, Europe is no longer the centrepiece of American 
grand strategy; thus even the active opposition of some leading European states to the Iraq war, though 
damaging, was not fatal. Indeed, neither the threat to oppose the war nor the execution of that threat 
was serious enough to deter American action. 
But a learning process was likewise underway in the United States. There, at least among the 
chattering classes, lingering triumphalism regarding the Soviet Union’s demise was slowly replaced 
with the realization that in the post-Cold War environment, European support for US foreign policy 
was likely to be much more contingent than had previously been the case. While difficult relations 
                                                      
50  For example, the US decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol was announced at a coffee break; and the decision to 
rescind the Clinton administration’s agreement to the treaty forming the International Criminal Court, rather than simply 
failing to send it to the Senate (or indeed to send it on, since it stood no chance of ratification), had little legal or 
diplomatic precedent. 
51  ‘All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us, and many 
are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, 
whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.’ President Bush, ‘State of 
the Union’ address, 28 January 2003; full text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.  The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/08 © 2004 David M. Andrews  13 
 
with France had come to be expected (and largely accepted), it was a new experience to have 
American policy forcefully rejected by a German government.
52 But the unusually severe constraints 
that once bounded the Federal Republic’s foreign policy have been permanently loosened: having 
achieved reunification, and facing fewer threats to its external security than at any point in German 
history, Berlin now has a wider range of policy options open to it than at any past moment. And while 
it is unclear whether future governments of the Federal Republic will follow the lead of Gerhard 
Schroeder in actually courting confrontation with Washington, it is evident that future German 
governments are capable of doing so. This newfound capacity, paralleling the increased room for 
manoeuvre in American policy, represents a second fundamental change in the transatlantic relationship. 
Meanwhile, tensions within Europe during the run-up to the Iraq war—especially those between 
Britain and France—made a mess of the European Union’s pretensions to act as a coherent actor on 
the world stage. But it bears underlining that the foreign policies of Paris and London did not 
fundamentally change with the passing of the bipolar system. Quite the opposite, in fact; French and 
British policies have been reasonably harmonious with their Cold War precedents, far more so than 
policy in either Washington or Bonn and now Berlin. During the whole of the Iraq crisis, Tony Blair 
and Jacques Chirac adopted policies fully consistent with historic national preferences: that is to say, 
British affinity for, and French scepticism of, close partnership with Washington. Certainly the crisis 
exposed the underlying divisions between the UK and France—divisions, by the way, that Charles de 
Gaulle understood only too well. But the heightened tensions between these traditional rivals were 
primarily the result of changes of policy in America and Germany, not London or Paris. 
Prospects for a New Bargain 
If the old Atlantic bargain lost much of its mutual appeal in the Cold War’s wake, and has 
subsequently lost a great deal of its credibility, is a new bargain possible, and can a new strategic 
equilibrium be developed to sustain it? Given the end of the bipolar international system, the 
disappearance (or at least abeyance) of a security threat emanating from Moscow, and the recent but 
substantial deterioration of relations between the United States and several of its key NATO partners, 
the task will not be easy. Given these challenges, success will depend in the first instance upon 
fashioning a new political grand bargain that corresponds more closely to current strategic realities.  
Recall that the old bargain relied on trading American support for European security and prosperity 
in exchange for European support for (or at least acquiescence in the face of) US policy activism on a 
global basis. But plainly neither side values this exchange at present as much as they did in the past. 
To begin with, the continental powers have substantially discounted the value of America’s security 
guarantees following the end of the Cold War. This development is fully understandable, even if 
assessments of the continuing value of American guarantees vary across European capitals (largely 
corresponding to their distance from Moscow) and even if that discounting has perhaps been 
unreasonably steep by some. For their part American authorities have likewise discounted, at least in 
                                                      
52  Commentators have therefore struggled to explain why the American public was so much more exercised by French 
rather than German opposition to US policy towards Iraq, and have supplied a variety of arguments (typically cultural 
and often patronizing) to account for this. I submit that the explanation is more straightforward: first, Americans for the 
most part accepted, and indeed had some sympathy for, an essentially pacifist policy emanating from Berlin, given 
Germany’s difficult history, but found the articulation of similar arguments by French authorities opportunistic at best. 
Second, most Americans correctly recognized that Paris, not Berlin, was playing the leading role in organizing opposition 
to Washington’s policies in the Security Council. Whether that role entitled Paris to praise or opprobrium depended 
largely on how individual citizens felt about the war; most Americans enthusiastically supported the conflict, at least at 
the time it was undertaken, and popular attitudes towards France reflected that stance; likewise retrospective uncertainty 
about the war has tended to erode, at least to a small degree, anti-French sentiment. David M. Andrews 
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part, the value of European political support for US policies. This too is understandable, even if 
Washington is now having to reassess just how costly the Iraq intervention has been (and will continue 
to be) in the absence of genuine multilateral support—an assessment that will cast a long shadow over 
future calculations regarding similar engagements. 
If the old bargain is no longer viable, what might replace it? Some argue that ‘Washington must 
shift course and accept multilateral conditions for intervention’ while Europeans must ‘be prepared to 
pick up much of the burden of conflict prevention and post conflict engagement.’
53 While such an 
approach is superficially rational, it is unlikely to have sufficient attractive power to influence policy 
consistently on either side of the Atlantic. Especially after the Iraq crisis, the implementation of such 
an exchange would normally entail substantial domestic costs in both the United States and in Europe; 
and the analyses of national politics (especially in France and the United States) in this volume suggest 
that governments will frequently be unwilling to bear those costs.
54  
Put differently, a moderately revamped version of the old Atlantic bargain is unlikely to prove 
stable. The old bargain was at perennial risk even in the context of the Cold War struggle: that is to 
say, even when there was a clearly recognized mutual foe, a commonly agreed strategy to engage that 
foe, and a credible threat by that foe to punish instances of alliance failure. Absent these enabling 
conditions, the domestic costs of compliance with the terms of such a revamped agreement are likely 
to swamp the perceived strategic benefits. This is the sort of arithmetic elected governments understand. 
Leaving aside for the moment the exact content of a new Atlantic bargain, what are the chances of 
developing a new political equilibrium that could sustain the Alliance? First recall the complex 
calculations of the Cold War partnership. The Alliance successfully deterred Soviet adventurism in 
western Europe in part by allaying the Kremlin’s concerns about an overly independent and powerful 
West German state. This formula also addressed French security concerns about Germany, even 
though these largely went unvoiced. And successive governments of the FRG were prepared to accept 
the ensuing arrangement, even when it did not please them. Meanwhile, a combination of factors 
moderated Franco-American antagonisms; primary among these was self-restraint in Washington and 
Paris, in the latter case reinforced by Bonn’s unwillingness to support a genuinely anti-American 
stance within the European Community.  
None of these sustaining elements remain in place. Let us begin with the American case. While the 
jury is still out on the eventual shape of America’s post-9/11 grand strategy,
55 self-restraint has not 
been a defining characteristic of foreign policy during the Bush administration.
56 And while the threat 
assessment continues to vary, with leading American analysts disputing the nature of the most 
                                                      
53 Andrew Moravcsik 2003. ‘Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain’, Foreign Affairs, 82(4), pp. 74-89, quote from p. 75. For 
a trenchant warning about forthcoming problems offering a similarly pragmatic prescription, see Malcom Chalmers 2001. 
‘The Atlantic Burden-Sharing Debate: Widening or Fragmenting?’, International Affairs, 77(3) pp. 569-585. 
54 On the difficulties of swapping American moderation for European aid in reconstruction, Ronald Asmus concludes that 
‘no American leader of any political persuasion will accept the proposition that the basis for a U.S.-European partnership 
should be containment of U.S. ability to act,’ while Douglas Hurd notes that ‘out of Kosovo came the bitter saying that 
the Americans fight the wars while Europe does the dishes. That is not a sound basis for an alliance.’ Asmus 2003. 
‘Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, pp. 20-31, at p. 29; Hurd, 2001. ‘Europe Must Respond to the Arc of 
Danger’, Financial Times 28 March, p. 23. 
55 The National Security Strategy of the United States, a policy statement published a year after the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and Pentagon, contains diverse elements, some of them suggesting a hegemonic realism (à la Theodore 
Roosevelt) but others pointing towards Wilsonian idealism. See the full text at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.  
56 On the foreign policy peregrinations of the Bush administration, compare National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s 
article in the January-February 2000 edition of Foreign Affairs cited supra note 46, in which she argued that the new 
administration would distinguish itself from its predecessor by focusing on America’s strategic relations with the other 
great powers (primarily Russia and China), with her remarks in the summer of 2003, when she argued that bringing 
freedom and democracy to the Middle East was ‘the security challenge and the moral mission of our time.’ ‘U.S. 
Promises Democracy in Middle East; Rice Calls for “Generational Commitment”’, Washington Post, 8 August 2003. The Atlantic Alliance after Iraq 
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significant threats to US security and hence the most appropriate template for grand strategy, it is far 
from clear that this uncertainty bodes well for the Alliance. What is plain is that a security 
environment characterized by rogue states with WMD, non-state terrorist groups, and continuing great 
power rivalry is enormously complex. This suggests that the administration will continue to hedge its 
bets, unless an even more devastating terrorist incident affirms that 9-11 really did ‘change everything.’ 
Such a slow transition to a new security doctrine on the part of the world’s leading power is of 
course fairly natural. It takes time to adjust to new challenges, and the combination of stateless 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the widespread availability of biological weapons raises difficult 
intellectual conundrums. Some fifty years ago, the development of an intellectual consensus among 
elites about the appropriate response to the nuclear revolution took well over a decade; the current 
security environment, with its multiplicity of both weapons and actors, is at least as complex.
57 This 
suggests that we are entering a new era in which not only US foreign policy but the policies of both its 
allies and adversaries, current and potential, will be characterized by the probing of alternative 
approaches unless and until a new strategic consensus emerges. 
But it also means, as suggested earlier, that alliance management—though important and perhaps 
even critical to international policing efforts in the fight against terrorism—does not and likely will not 
occupy the central space on the American strategic agenda that it once did, and that it had to, during 
the Cold War. This is indeed one of the logical consequences of the passing of the Soviet threat. And 
absent a geopolitical imperative to devote substantial resources (including the time and attention of 
senior officials) to resolving transatlantic crises as they arise, there is greater scope for small problems 
to fester and for larger problems occasionally to explode, as they did during spring 2003. This suggests 
that the United States, at least intermittently and probably on average, will be a more difficult partner 
than in times past, regardless of the administration of the day. 
Let us turn now to France. French political elite, including the most senior officials of the French 
government, have explicitly framed discussions of foreign policy in terms of balancing American 
power, as the chapter in this volume by Georges-Henri Soutou describes. Of course it may seem odd 
that an alliance would be aimed at containing the power of one of its members, as opposed to an 
external foe. But there is an important precedent in the complex machinations of the Cold War 
Atlantic partnership: one of the principal aims of NATO, after all, was to contain West German 
political and military independence. Even so, this objective always remained implicit: it is difficult to 
imagine even an Adenauer persuading his countrymen to accept engagement in an institution whose 
publicly stated purpose was to limit German sovereignty. The French foreign policy establishment 
therefore wisely exercised sustained discretion throughout the Cold War in pursuing one agenda while 
proclaiming another. 
But in the longstanding French debate about global politics that preceded the Iraq crisis (and indeed 
has characterized Chirac’s statements about the international political system since the mid-1990s), no 
such discretion was apparent. Quite the opposite, in fact: the establishment of a multipolar world 
system in which American political and military pre-eminence could be effectively challenged has 
now been an avowed objective of French foreign policy for at least eight years. Since it is not hard to 
imagine how the public articulation of such a vision would be received by American citizens and their 
elected representatives, this suggests either that the French stance is not serious—that is, that the 
senior officials who engage in this rhetoric either do not really desire this outcome, except in a wistful 
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sort of way—or else that the government intends to pursue this policy outside of the Alliance. Neither 
conclusion bodes well for NATO. 
If indeed the long-term logic of international politics is to balance against preponderant power, then 
the eventual formation of anti-American alliance is inevitable. But other formulations of realist theory 
maintain that states balance against rival threats, not power per se, in which case such an outcome is 
far from assured.
58 In any event, episodic but substantial crises can be expected as long as the principal 
interlocutors of the Atlantic relationship remain Paris and Washington, since in neither of these 
capitals does the political establishment believe any longer that accommodation with the other should 
be a guiding principle of foreign policy. While such accommodation was never popular, during the 
Cold War at least a critical mass of elites held that it was essential, and their will generally prevailed; 
that outcome is considerably less likely to obtain in the future.  
What, then, about the possibility that the Federal Republic might one day reassume its traditional 
mediating role between the United States and France? The chapter by Hubert Zimmermann in this 
volume is relatively optimistic about the prospects for institutionalized collaboration between 
Germany (and with it the rest of the European Union) and the United States over the medium term. I 
am not so sanguine; now that the genie of anti-Americanism has been let out of the bottle of German 
domestic politics by a sitting German government, it is not clear that it can be locked up once more. 
Future debates within the Federal Republic will take place within a much more elastic international 
policy environment, as discussed earlier, but also against the historical backdrop of Schroeder’s 
precedent; thus not only have structural circumstances changed, the German electorate’s awareness of 
those circumstances has changed as well. Cooperation across a wide range of measures should 
nonetheless be expected, given the deep and ever-growing economic ties that reach across the Atlantic. 
But the prospects for periodic clashes of the Schroeder-Bush variety cannot be dismissed, and will 
therefore colour calculations on both sides. 
Nevertheless, there are clear signs that both the German government and the Federal Republic’s 
political establishment more generally have had second thoughts about realigning Berlin decisively 
away from Washington and towards Paris. These second thoughts could in due course assume any of 
several different forms. Indeed, the trauma of breaking with the Americans on such a critical issue as 
Iraq may make it easier for the Federal Republic to assert its eventual independence from France as 
well. By this I do not mean a breakdown in the close collaboration that has been the hallmark of 
European integration; rather, I mean that Germans may some day feel able to publicly assert, within 
the context of continued European integration, a national position that is diametrically at odds with 
central French aspirations (just as Berlin asserted publicly, within the context of continued NATO 
cooperation, its opposition to American policy in Iraq).  
In other words, the Federal Republic managed to break with the Americans on a key issue without 
endangering European security; a future German government may likewise one day decide that they 
are able to break with the French without threatening the project of European integration. This would 
represent a revolution in European relations whose repercussions would be felt across the Atlantic. 
Another possibility, perhaps more likely, is that instead of visible confrontation, behind-the-scenes 
consultations between Germany and France will once again exert a moderating effect on French 
policy. While London and, more recently, Warsaw have hoped to exert that sort of influence, neither 
of these capitals plays the central role in French global calculations that Berlin does. This position 
provides the Federal Republic with pivotal influence. More so than in any other European state, a 
future German government could become the mediator of a new Atlantic dialogue and a revitalized 
Atlantic alliance.  
The irony of this is unmistakable. Germany was the target of the Grand Alliance of the mid-
twentieth century, and containing Germany was a principal task of the anti-Soviet coalition that 
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formed in the wake of the anti-Nazi war. Now the foreign policy decisions of a democratic and 
reunified Germany, decisions that will be made in the context of unprecedented room for domestic and 
international manoeuvre, will be a central factor in determining the shape of international politics in 
the 21
st century. But while Germany is destined to play a decisive role in the future of the Atlantic 
alliance, it is not yet clear what that role will be, nor is it evident that the present German government 
knows what it wants to accomplish in its international policy. Under such circumstances, even inaction 
becomes a policy choice; it may turn out that the ‘decisive’ German role will simply be to permit 
relations between France and the United States to deteriorate further, in a predictable series of future 
clashes between Paris and Washington. If so, the existing institutions of the Atlantic community, 
already deeply strained, will erode further and may eventually break.  
The dispute over the Bush administration’s plans to unseat Saddam laid bare these tensions among 
the Atlantic allies, but it did not create them; indeed the roots of the current problems have been 
evident and growing for over a decade. But whereas a favourable confluence of temporary 
circumstances once mitigated an Atlantic crisis, many of those same circumstances have since come to 
exacerbate it. A skilled and attractive US president has been replaced by one who is, at least in 
European eyes, profoundly unsympathetic, and a series of military conflicts meeting with Europe’s 
general approval have been followed by a contest that was deeply unpopular. As a result, the deep rifts 
at the heart of the Atlantic community, rifts that were previously latent, have been laid bare.  
The result is an international system in flux, with no new Atlantic equilibrium yet evident—that is, 
no new and mutually beneficial meshing of national strategies among the Atlantic partners around a 
framework for political, security and economic relations that, like its counterpart from the Cold War 
era, is likely to prove sustainable over at least the medium term. Such an equilibrium might well be 
established once more, but restoration of a strategic balance built around the previous Atlantic 
framework is unlikely. The strategic basis of that framework is now dead; constructing a new and vital 
alliance from its ashes will require both concerted effort and creative thinking. This volume is a first 
step in the process of that rethinking, a stock-taking exercise characterized by a combination of 
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